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IMPLEMENTING WATERS V. CHURCHILL IN LIGHT OF
THE LOUDERMILL PRETERMINATION HEARING

Laura L. Scarry*

I. INTRODUCTION

Public employees, unlike their counterparts in the private
sector, enjoy the protections of the First Amendment of the United
States Constitution. In the past, public employees were vulnerable
to retaliation for exercising their First Amendment rights. For the
past thirty years, the Supreme Court has recognized that employees
have a constitutionally protected right to engage in free speech.' In
Pickering v. Board of Education, the Supreme Court held that the
government may not discharge an employee on the basis of
constitutionally protected speech even if the speech is directed at the
speaker's employer.'
The Supreme Court has also recognized that the
government, as a public employer, has a right to efficiently and
effectively run its workplace. In 1983, the Court held in Connick
v. Meyers3 that a public employee's speech is protected by the First

The author is a 1995 graduate of Chicago-Kent College of Law, and a 1992
graduate (B.A., summa cum laude) of Carthage College in Kenosha, Wisconsin.
The author was a police officer for the Lake Forest, Illinois Police Department
from 1986-1992.
1 Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
2 Id.

at 574.

3 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
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Amendment only if it addresses a matter of public concern.'
However, the Court held that speech addressing a matter of public
concern will not be protected if it is unduly disruptive.5
In 1994, the Supreme Court rendered another, albeit
confusing, decision addressing the First Amendment in public
employment. In determining whether an employer is liable for
terminating an employee for First Amendment-protected speech, the
Court in Waters v. Churchill6 addressed the question of whether the
Pickering-Connicktests "should be applied to what the government
employer thought was said or to what the trier of fact ultimately
determines to have been said."7 Justice O'Connor, writing for the
plurality, adopted neither approach and instead created a
"reasonable investigations" test. Under this standard, all that is
required by an employer is that he look "to the facts as [he]
reasonably found them to be. "8
However, the decision rendered in Waters fails to provide
guidance concerning the extent to which an employer must
investigate in order to avoid liability for violating the employee's
First Amendment rights to free speech. In addition, the decision
does not afford public employees adequate protection when the
conduct in question is speech. This article addresses the
implementation of the Waters requirement to a. reasonable

4

1d. at 154.
Id.

6 Waters

v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 114 S.Ct. 1878 (1994).

IId. at 1882 (Justice O'Connor, joined with the Chief Justice and two Justices
concurring and three Justices concurring in the judgment).
8 Id.

at 1889.
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investigation. Specifically, it will detail the circumstances under
which an employer must investigate beyond the employee conduct
which was the subject of the complaint to determine whether the
complaint involved First Amendment protected speech?
Part II of this article addresses the First Amendment's
application to speech in public employment. Part IRl presents the
facts in Waters v. Churchill, the lower court decisions and the
Supreme Court's decision. Part IV addresses what process is due
to protect First Amendment rights. Finally, Part V suggests that as
part of a reasonable investigation the employer must give the
employee a pretermination hearing whenever the employee's
conduct is speech. Such a pretermination hearing gives the
employee notice of the reason for the discharge and an opportunity
to respond or rebut the charges. However, this does not mean a
pretermination hearing should be required when the employee is
being discharged for misconduct that does not involve speech.
H. FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION AND PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT

The First Amendment of the United States Contitution

states that "Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom
of speech. .

.

. "9

It is true that in the past, public employees

who suffered reprisals for the exercise of their constitutional rights
had no protection. For instance, in McAuliffe v. Mayor of New
Bedford, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes stated:
The petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk
politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a
policeman. There are few employments for hire in
which the servant does not agree to suspend his
constitutional right of free speech, as well as of

9 U.S. CONST.

amend. I.
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idleness, by the implied terms of his contract. The
servant cannot complain, as he takes the employment
on the terms which are offered him.'0

In other words, public employees may have had a constitutional
right to free speech but they had no corresponding right to public
employment. As long as the employee had the "privilege" to work
for the government, he did not have a "right" to free speech.
However, the Court's jurisprudence moved away from the
right-privilege distinction in the late 1960s. The Supreme Court has
stated that "public employment... may [not] be conditioned upon
the surrender of constitutional rights which could not be abridged
by direct government action."'" Since its 1968 decision in
Pickering, the Supreme Court has held that the government may not

discharge a public employee for constitutionally protected speech.12
An employee's speech is protected by the First Amendment if "the
interests of the [employee], as a citizen, in commenting on matters
10 McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517-18 (Mass. 1892).
11Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 605-06 (1967). See also
Slochower v. Board of Educ., 350 U.S. 551, 557 (1956) (public school teacher
could not be discharged for invoking the Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination when questioned by a congressional committee); O'Connor v.
Ortega, 480 U.S. 709,.709-10 (1987) (searches by government supervisors of the
private property of their employees are subject to Fourth Amendment restraints);
Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 385 (1987) (clerical employee's comment
in a county constable's office, after hearing of an attempt on the life of the
President, "If they go for him again, I hope they get him," was protected by the
First Amendment.).
See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568 (public employees may not "constitutionally be
compelled to relinquish the First Amendment rights they would otherwise enjoy
as citizens to comment on matters of public interest in connection with the
operations of the public [entity] in which they work.").
12
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of public concern" outweigh "the interest of the State, as an
employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it
performs through its employees."' 3 However, the Court stated in
Connick that if the public employee's speech "cannot be fairly
characterized as constituting speech on a matter of public concern,
it is unnecessary ...

to scrutinize the reasons for her discharge." 4

In other words, if the speech does not address a matter of public
concern, it is not protected and the balancing test need not be
applied.
Hence, the Connick decision established a two-part test in
ascertaining whether a public employee's speech is protected by the
First Amendment. First, the court must determine if the
employee's speech addressed a matter of public concern by looking
at the content, form, and context of the employee's speech, as
revealed by the whole record.' 5 Second, if the speech addresses a
matter of public concern, the court must balance the employees'
interest as a public citizen commenting on a matter of public
concern against the employer's interest in maintaining an effective
and efficient workplace. Then, if the employee's speech is
protected according to the balancing test, the employee must show
that the speech was a substantial or motivating factor in the
employer's decision not to rehire him. Once an employee has met
this burden of proof, the employer must demonstrate by a
preponderance of the evidence that it would have reached the same

13Yd.
14

Connick, 461 U.S. at 146.

'5 Id. at 147-48.
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decision to terminate even in the absence of the protected conduct
6
to escape liability. 1
In Waters, the question arose as to how to apply the
balancing test enunciated by Pickering and Connick. Specifically,
should the test "be applied to what the government employer
thought was said or to what the trier of fact ultimately determines
to have been said"? 17 In its decision, the Supreme Court adopted
neither extreme, and opted for a middle course stating that the
employer need only conduct a reasonable investigation to determine
what the speech actually was.'" More importantly, the Supreme
Court opinion addresses important aspects of the free speech rights
of public employees, and may have even expanded the procedural
protections offered these employees.
I. WATERS V. CHURCHILL

A. The Facts
Churchill, a nurse in the obstetrics department of a public
hospital, had a conversation on January 16, 1987 with another
nurse, Perkins-Graham, who was considering transferring to
obstetrics. The conversation took place during dinner break and
was overheard by two other nurses, Ballew and Welty, and Dr.
Koch, the clinical head of obstetrics. A few days later Ballew
advised Churchill's supervisor, Waters, that Churchill talked about

16

See Mt. Healthy City School District Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274,

287 (1977).
17Waters,

114 S.Ct. at 1882.

,1 Id. at 1189.
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Waters and "how bad things are in [obstetrics] in general."' 9 In
addition, Ballew stated that the portions of the conversation she

heard were "negative and intended to dampen the enthusiasm" of
Perkins-Graham.20 Waters interviewed Ballew a second time and
Ballew stated she heard Churchill say Waters "was trying to find

reasons to fire her.",21 Waters and Davis, the hospital's vice
president of nursing, interviewed Perkins-Graham, who told them

that Churchill did say negative things about Waters and that she
mentioned a negative evaluation that Waters had given Churchill.'

19

Waters v. Churchill, 977 F.2d 1114, 1118 (7th Cir. 1992).

o Petitioner's Brief at 4, Waters v. Churchill, 114 S.Ct. 1878 (1994) (No. 921450). However, neither Waters nor Davis inquired as to whether PerkinsGraham's enthusiasm had been "dampened" by the conversation and PerkinsGraham did not say it had been. Respondent's Brief at 13, Waters (No. 921450).
21 Waters,

114 S.Ct. at 1882. However, Ballew testified that she was answering
patient lights and performing other nursing tasks when the speech occurred,
Waters v. Churchill, 731 F. Supp. 311, 314 (C.D. 111. 1990), and that she just
"heard voices" and "snatches and pieces" of the conversation; she overheard the.
conversation after it began and "[came] in the middle of sentence[s]" and the
conversation "[didn't] make any sense" to her. Respondent's Brief at 12, Waters
(No. 92-1450).
2 Churchill had received an evaluation in December, 1986 in which she was
rated as having standard performance. However, Waters had handwritten at the
end of the evaluation that Churchill's attitude towards her "promotes an
unpleasant atmosphere and hinders constructive communication and
cooperation." Waters, 977 F.2d at 1118. This was the second time since the
start of Churchill's employment with the hospital in 1982 that she received any
criticism of her performance. Churchill received a written warning in the fall of
1986 for insubordination because of her comment to Waters: "You don't have
to tell me how to do my job." Id.

92
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Perkins-Graham also related that Churchill said Davis was
"ruining" the hospital.'

On the other hand, Churchill stated that she spoke of her
concern about the hospital's "cross-training" policy. 24 She stated
that the policy threatened patient care because it provided no
training, only coverage of staff shortages. Churchill did admit to

criticizing Davis, saying Davis' cross-training policy was "ruining"
the hospital by hindering patient care. Churchill denied making
personal criticisms of Waters. Instead, Churchill claimed she

defended Waters and suggested that Perkins-Graham join obstetrics.
Koch and Welty, whose versions of the conversation were
consistent with Churchill's version, were not interviewed by Davis
and Waters.' Nor did they talk to Churchill until the day she was
fired.26

21

Waters. 114 S.Ct. at 1883.

24 Davis

initiated a "cross-training" program during which nurses would transfer
to different departments other than those in which they were trained.
I The failure to interview Dr. Koch is interesting in light of the fact that the
Seventh Circuit noted he was extremely vocal about the nurse staffing policy -his concern began after a 1982 birth of a stillborn baby in which he blamed
inadequate nurse staffing. Like Churchill, Dr. Koch disagreed with the crosstraining policy and it was perceived by the hospital administration that. they were
professional allies. See Waters, 977 F.2d at 1117 (stating Koch and Churchill
became social friends in 1986 and were subsequently married in 1991).
26 And

even then, Davis and Waters did not ask Churchill for her version of the
story but told her that she had been overheard speaking negatively about
obstetrics without telling her with whom or when she was overheard or what she
supposedly said. See Respondent's Brief at 14, Waters (No. 92-1450).
However, Davis said that she "had enough information" after receiving Ballew's
and Perkins-Graham's reports and so she did not need to talk to Churchill. See
Petitioner's Brief at 12, Waters (No. 92-1450).
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Having been discharged, Churchill filed an internal
grievance after which Hopper, the president of the hospital, heard
Churchill's side of the story.27 Hopper limited the discussion to
the written warning to Churchill,28 the negative comments on her
1986 evaluation, and her conversation with an unidentified crosstrainee at an unidentified time during which she criticized Waters
and Davis. 29 He also reviewed Waters' and Davis' written reports
and had Ballew interviewed one more time by the vice president of
human resources. Not surprisingly, Hopper dismissed Churchill's
grievance.
Churchill sued the hospital and individual supervisors under
42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming her discharge violated her First
Amendment rights. The United States District Court denied
Churchill's motion for summary judgment.3 ° The United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that
Churchill's speech was protected. 31 The court also concluded that
the investigation of such incidents must turn on what was actually
I At the meeting during which the decision was made to fire Churchill, Hooper
was present along with Waters, Davis and the personnel director of the hospital,
Magin. Understandably, the Seventh Circuit characterized Churchill's grievance
proceeding as a "star-chamber proceeding" in that Churchill was completely
unaware of the fact that Hopper was involved in the decision to discharge her.
See Waters, 977 F.2d at 1119.
8See supranote 18.
Churchill thought that the conversation was the one she remembered having
about cross-training and attempted to advise Hopper of the problem with crosstraining; however, Hopper said "he didn't want to get into that." See
Respondent's Brief at 14, Waters (No. 92-1450); Waters, 977 F.2d at 1119.
29

30

Waters, 731 F. Supp. at 311.

31 Waters,

977 F.2d at 1114.
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said and not what the employer thought was said. The United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari to review this precise
holding.
B. The District Court and Appellate Court Opinions
The District Court granted summary judgment to the
hospital, holding that Churchill's speech was not a matter of public
concern, and that in any case, it was outweighed by the hospital's
interest in maintaining efficiency in the workplace. The district
court also held that Churchill did not have a property interest in
continuing her employment with the hospital because the hospital
employee handbook contained a disclaimer "expressly disavow[ing]
any attempt to be bound," and "stat[ing] that its contents [were] not
to be considered conditions of employment. ,,32
The Seventh Circuit reversed, stating that the content of
Churchill's conversation was in dispute and was a question of fact
for the jury. Moreover, the court held that:
[w]hen a public employer fires an employee for
engaging in speech, and that speech is later found to
be protected under the First Amendment, the
employer is liable for violating the employee's freespeech rights regardless of what the employer knew
at the time of the termination. If the employer
chooses to discharge the employee without sufficient
knowledge of her protected speech as a result of an
inadequate investigation into the employee's
conduct, the employer runs the risk of eventually

32

Waters, 731 F. Supp. at 319.
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being required to remedy any wrongdoing whether
it was deliberate or accidental.33
The Decision of the Supreme Court

C.

The Supreme Court examined whether "the court should
apply the Conhzick test to the employee's perception of the speech,
or ask the jury to determine the facts? The Court of Appeals held
that the employer's factual conclusions were irrelevant, and the jury
should engage in factfinding. '3" The hospital argued that "the
employer's factual conclusions should be dispositive," while
Churchill, on the other hand, suggested that the court take a stance
in the middle: "[tihe court should accept the employer's factual
conclusions, but only if those conclusions were arrived at
reasonably..." 31 Justice O'Connor, writing for a four-Justice
plurality, chose to adopt Churchill's position.36
Justice O'Connor recognized the need for "sound"
substantive First Amendment standards "applied through reliable
procedures." '37 O'Connor also acknowledged that the First
Amendment may be violated "even if the government actor honestly
believes the speech is unprotected." 38 In addition, O'Connor
33 Waters, 977 F.2d at 1127.

34 Waters, 114 S.Ct. at 1884.
35 Id.
3 5Chief

Justice Rehnquist, Justice Ginsberg and Justice Souter joined in Justice
O'Connor's opinion. Id. at 1882.
37 Waters, 114 S.Ct. at 1884.
38

Id. at 1885.
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recognized that "the First Amendment creates a strong presumption
against punishing protected speech even inadvertently," and that
"the procedure adopted by the Court of Appeals may lower the
chance of protected speech being erroneously punished.""
Nevertheless, O'Connor stated that the Supreme Court has "never
set forth a general test to determine when a procedural safeguard is
required by the First Amendment" and it would "not purport to do
so now. "I Instead, O'Connor chose to address the question on a
case-by-case basis "until some workable general rule emerges,"
balancing "the cost of the procedure [against] the relative magnitude
significance of the risks it would decrease and
and constitutional
41
increase.
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens asserted that as
long as the employee's speech is not unduly disruptive, the
employer should be required to act on what was actually said and
not on what it believed was said. Justice O'Connor disagreed,
indicating that a government employer should be able to draw on
conclusions it, as an experienced professional manager, can draw
from the circumstances. O'Connor also stated that a government
employer often relies on hearsay, knowledge of the accused
employee's character and work records, and the party's relative
credibility. Decisions made by public and private employers are
often based on incomplete information and the need for rapid

39

Id.

4 Id.

Id. at 1886. Justice O'Connor's analysis in this case is similar to the Mathews
balancing test. See Mathews v. Elderidge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (balancing
the private interest in retaining employment, the governmental interest in the
expeditious removal of unsatisfactory employees and the avoidance of
41

administrative burdens, and the risk of an erroneous termination).
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investigations of disruptive employee conduct. In contrast to the
Seventh Circuit and Justice Stevens, O'Connor stated
"[g]overnment employers should be allowed to use personnel
procedures that differ from the evidentiary rules used by courts,
without fear that these differences will lead to liability."42 Justice
O'Connor also acknowledged that "[i]t is true that these practices
involve some risk of erroneously punishing protected speech," but
added that it has never been "a violation of the Constitution for a
an employee based on
government employer to discharge
43
"
information.
substantively incorrect
Justice O'Connor indicated that although personnel decisions
are best left to the expertise of government managers, such
decisions should be based on the reasonableness of the employer's
conclusions. Justice Scalia, in his concurring opinion, criticized
Justice O'Connor's reasonableness test.' Instead, Scalia proposed
an "intent" standard under which an employer would not be liable
under the First Amendment for discharging a public employee if the
employer did so for a valid reason and not to punish the employee
for his views. Justice O'Connor agreed to a certain extent, stating,
"it is necessary that the decisionmaker reach its conclusion about
what was said in good faith, rather than as a pretext; but it does not
follow that good faith is sufficient." 45 O'Connor further stated
42 Waters, 114 S.Ct. at.1888 (also stating that "[m]anagement can spend only so
much of their time on any one employment decision.").
41

Id. at 1888-90.

" Id. at 1893 (stating that "[t]his recognition of a broad First Amendment
procedural right is in my view unprecedented, superfluous to the decision in the
present case, unnecessary for protection of public-employee speech on matters
of public concern, and unpredictable in its application and consequences.").

4' Id.

at 1889.
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"[w]e think employer decisionmaking will not be unduly burdened
by having courts look to the facts as the employer reasonably found
them to be," and "[o]nly procedures outside the range of what a

reasonable manager would

use may

be

condemned as

O'Connor's plurality opinion recognized the
unreasonable."'
importance of protecting First Amendment concerns through
procedural due process and acknowledged the government's interest
as an employer.
Applying the reasonableness test to the facts in Waters,
O'Connor stated that "if it is clear that [the hospital] really did
believe Perkins-Graham's and Ballew's story, and fired Churchill

because of it, they must win. Their belief, based on the
investigation they conducted, would have been entirely
reasonable." 47 In addition, the final decisionmaker' "had the word
of two trusted employees, the endorsement of those employees'
reliability by three hospital managers, and the benefit of a face-to-

4 Id.
47 Id. at

1890.

I The final decision-maker is the official responsible for discharging the
employee and is usually a supervisor or other administrator of the employer for
'which the employee works. Robert F. Maslan, Jr., Bias and the Loudennill
Hearing:Due Process or Lip Service to FederalLaw?, 57 FoRDHAM L. REV.
1093, 1093 n.10 (1989) (citing as examples Page v. DeLaune, 837 F.2d 233,
235-36 (5th Cir. 1988) (supervisor); Mathews v. Harney Co. School Dist. No.
4, 819 F.2d 889, 890 (9th Cir. 1987) (school board); Washington v. Kirksey,
811 F.2d 561, 562-63 (11th Cir. 1986) (school superintendent), cert. denied,
108 S.Ct. 96 (1987); Brown v. Texas A & M Univ., 804 F.2d 327, 329 (5th Cir.
1986) (university administrator); Buschi v. Kirven, 775 F.2d 1240, 1255-56 (4th
Cir. 1985) (hospital administrator); Brasslett v. Cota, 761 F.2d 827, 829 (1st
Cir. 1985) (town manager)).
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face meeting with the employee he fired." 49 Moreover, even if
Churchill's speech addressed a matter of public concern, the Court
said that Churchill's speech was unprotected under Connick because
outweigh whatever First
her speech was sufficiently disruptive 5"to
0
had.,,
have
might
it
value
Amendment
The application of O'Connor's reasonableness test to the
facts in Waters is oversimplified, especially in light of the fact that
the hospital may have been wrong about what the true content of
Churchill's speech was. Justice O'Connor left open the question of
just how far a public employer should go when conducting an
investigation of an employee's alleged conduct which leading to her
discharge. For example, where an employer receives a complaint
of employee misconduct that does not on its face involve speech,
must the employer investigate until it knows speech was not
covertly behind the complaint?
D. Application of Waters
City "X" has a low crime rate. The officers try to keep
themselves busy during their eight-hour shifts by driving through
their beats and talking to people but sometimes the boredom
becomes too great. So, the officers usually take along newspapers
or other reading material to pass the time, even though reading
while on duty is prohibited by the department's rules and
regulations. This -conduct has never been brought to the -attention
of the department supervisors.
Meanwhile, because the other officers in the department
disagree with our hypothetical officer's political views, they agree

49 Waters, 114 S.Ct. at 1890.
50

Id.

100
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among themselves that he should not be a member of the
department. Officers alert their supervisor to the fact that this
officer has been reading while on duty, in violation of the
department's rules and regulations. The supervisor, as part of his
investigation, obtains statements from the two complaining officers.
In addition, while our hypothetical officer is later sitting in his
squad car observing traffic at an intersection, the supervisor
approaches the car so as not to be noticed by the officer and is able
to see that he is reading a newspaper. At the conclusion of his
investigation, the supervisor recommends to city "X" that the
officer be discharged from the police department for violating the
department's rules and regulations. City "X" discharges the
officer.
Unquestionably, the officer was discharged for engaging in
prohibited conduct, specifically, reading while on duty. The
prohibited conduct, however, was brought to the attention of a
supervisor only because the officer maintained political views which
differed from those of the rest of the department. Should the
supervisor have stopped his investigation of the officer's non-speech
misconduct on its face after the two employees corroborated, just
as the hospital did in Waters, where the misconduct did involve
speech? Or should the supervisor have been required, at least, to
question the officer before he was terminated? Should the hospital
have been required to question Churchill before she was
terminated? The -potential solution to these questions lies in 'the
application of a pretermination hearing. During such a hearing the
employee would be given: (1) a notice of the alleged conduct which
may ultimately lead to her discharge; and (2) an opportunity to
explain or rebut the charges against her.
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V. WHAT PROCESS IS DUE To PROTECT FIRST AMENDMENT

RIGHTS?

A. Procedural Due Process and the First Amendment
The Supreme Court has recognized that some procedural
requirements are mandated by the First Amendment while some are

not." In doing so, the Court has cultivated a set of "'procedural
safeguards designed to obviate the dangers of a censorship
system, ' '12 relying not so much on the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments, but on the First Amendment itself.53 This is what

' 5
Henry Monaghan calls "First Amendment 'due process. " 1
Monaghan states that "central to First Amendment due process is
the notion that a judicial, rather than an administrative,

114 S.Ct. at 1894-95 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (citing
Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58-60 (1965) (government must bear
burden of proving that speech is unprotected); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513,
526 (1958) (same); Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 77578 (1986) (libel plaintiff must bear burden of proving that speech is false);
Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, - (1991) (actual malice
must be proven by clear and convincing evidence); Bose Corp. v. Consumers
Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 503-11 (1984) (appellate court must
make independent judgment about presence of actual malice)).
51 Waters,

I Henry P. Monaghan, FirstAmendment "DueProcess", 83 HARV.L. REV. 518,
518 (1970) (citing Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58 (1965) (discussing
the importance of procedural safeguards in the analysis of obscenity)).
53 Id.
54

Id.
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"
determination of the character of the speech is necessary. 55
However, as the Court in Connick correctly noted, "a federal court
is not the appropriate forum in which to review the wisdom of a
personnel decision taken by a public agency allegedly in reaction to
the employee's behavior."56 Indeed, Monaghan acknowledges that
"[t]o interpret the first amendment so as to require an evidentiary
hearing before speech can finally be restrained is one thing; but to
say that this evidentiary hearing must involve a court is quite
another."' Still, one can infer from the Supreme Court opinions
that the First Amendment requires at least a minimal type of
evidentiary hearing prior to restraining conduct related to protected
speech. Public employment due process issues, however, do not
focus as much upon First Amendment "due process" as they do
upon the procedural due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.

B. Procedural Due Process and Property Interests.
The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
provides that "[n]o state shall . . . deprive any person of...

11 Id. at 520. See Manual Enterprise v. Day, 370 U.S. 478, 489 (1962)
(Brennan, J., concurring) (holding that the Post Office lacked statutory authority
to exclude as "non-mailable" certain allegedly obscene materials); Bantam Books
v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70-71 (1963) (holding state obscene literature
commission not permitted to impose a final restraint on speech); Freedman, 380
U.S. at 567 (invalidating a statute requiring an exhibitor to submit motion picture
films to an administrative board prior to its showing).
56 Connick, 461 U.S. at 148.
57 Id.

at 524 n.23.
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property without due process of the law., 58 The Supreme Court has
held that public employees may have a "property" interest in their
continued employment requiring the protections of procedural due
process.5 9 If public employees have a property interest, "the State
[can]not deprive them of the property without due process. " 1°
Property interests are not created by the Constitution but are
"created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or

understandings that stem from an independent source such as state
law .. ..,,61
An employee has a property interest when he possesses
a legitimate claim of entitlement to continued employment.6 2
Sources defining property interests include state law, 63 tenure,64 a

contract,' or an "unwritten common law" of employment.'
58 U.S.

Public

CONSr. amend. XIV.

I" See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576-77 (1972); Perry v.
Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601 (1972).
' Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 538 (1985) (citing
Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1978); Goss v.
Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 573-74 (1975)).
61Louderijll, 470

U.S. at 538 (quoting Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. at

576-78).
62

See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. at 577.

6 Loudenmill, 470 U.S. at 538-39 (OiHo REv. CODE ANN. § 124.34 creates
entitlement to continued employment "during good behavior and efficient
service.").
See Slochower, 350 U.S. at 553-55.
5Lawsche v. Simpson, 16 F.3d 1475, 1480 (7th Cir. 1994).
Peny, 408 U.S. at 602.
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employees possessing property interests are entitled at least to be
heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner prior to
discharge. 67
V. THE LOUDERMILL PRETERMINATION HEARING

A. The LoudermillPretermination Hearing and Property
Interest
The Supreme Court stated in ClevelandBoard of Education
v. Loudennill that an individual should be given an opportunity for
a hearing before he is deprived of any significant property interest. 8
In addition to a pretermination hearing an employee must be
afforded a full evidentiary hearing, after the termination takes
effect.6 However, the scope of the pretermination hearing depends
upon the scope of the post-termination hearing available to the
employee. If a full post-termination hearing is available, the
Loudennill pretermination hearing is minimal. In such situations
the employee would have an opportunity to respond in the
pretermination hearing as long as she had available a posttermination hearing. Thus, the pre-termination hearing functions
as "an initial check against mistaken decision -- essentially a
determination of whether there are reasonable grounds to believe
that the charges against the employee are true and support the

Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965). See Mathews, 424 U.S. at
319. See also Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971); Board of
Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. at 569-70; Peny, 408 U.S. at 599.
61 Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 542 (citing Boddie, 401 U.S. at 379 (emphasis in

original)).
69 Loudermill, 470

U.S. at 545-46.
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proposed action."7" If a pretermination hearing is "oral or written
notice of the charges against [the employee], an explanation of the
employer's evidence [against the employee], and an opportunity [for
the employee] to present his side of the story." 7
The Waters majority stated that Churchill had no right to
any procedure under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment Because, as an at-will employee, she had no property
interest in her employment.' However, if Churchill did have a
property interest she would have been entitled to a pretermination
hearing.73 During the pretermination hearing Churchill would have
been presented with evidence against her. She would have known
that it was the conversation on January 16, 1987 with PerkinsGraham that was the cause for her discharge. She would have been
able to explain her version of the conversation during which she
voiced her concerns against the hospital's cross-training policy.
Certainly, then, the hospital would have known that Churchill's
speech touched upon a matter of public concern. But, because
Churchill was an at-will employee, she did not have a property
interest in her continued employment and therefore, was not entitled
to a Loudennill pretermination hearing.

70 Id.
71

Id. at 546.

72

See Waters, 114 S.Ct. at 1189, 1894. See also Waters, 731 F. Supp. at 320

(holding hospital's employee handbook did not give Churchill protected property
interest in continued employment).
I Utilizing the facts in the case, the post-termination hearing given to Churchill
would have failed the Loudermill test if Churchill was found to have had a

property interest because the hospital did not provide her with a pretermination
hearing and it refused to explain its evidence against Churchill.
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B. The Loudermill Pretermination Hearing When Employee
Lacks a Property Interest
1. When Employee is Discharged for Speech
A Loudermill pretermination hearing should be conducted as
part of the employer's reasonable investigation under Waters
whenever an employee is disciplined for speech as opposed to
conduct even though such employee lacks a property interest in her
continued employment. The underlying principle in Loudermill is
that because dismissals often involve factual disputes, a hearing
provides the employee an opportunity to explain and refute any
conclusions the employer reached which caused the employee's
discharge. 74 Presumably, during such a hearing the employer will
be on notice that the speech may have addressed a matter of public
concern and therefore is protected by the First Amendment. If so,
the employer must proceed with caution before deciding to
discharge the employee who engaged in the protected activity.
Indeed, as Justice O'Connor wrote in Waters, "[i]f an employment
action is based on what an employee supposedly said, and a
reasonable supervisor would recognize that there is a substantial
likelihood that what was actually said was protected, the manager
must tread with a certain amount of care[,]" because "we believe
that the possibility of inadvertently punishing someone for
exercising her First Amendment rights makes such care
necessary." 75 Because the employer, by the nature of the
complaint, knows that speech is involved, the employer should not
be allowed to do what the hospital did in Waters, in that the hospital

74 See Loudermill,
75

470 U.S. at 545.

Waters, 114 S.Ct. at 1889.
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did not give notice to Churchill of the reason(s) for her discharge
nor did it give Churchill an opportunity to respond or rebut the
charges against her despite her lack of property interest in continued
employment.
Justice O'Connor supports the proposition that despite an
employee's lack of property interest, a pretermination hearing
should be conducted whenever an employee's alleged conduct
involves speech. O'Connor rejected Justice Stevens' dissenting
opinion, which required that the public employer should engage in
a trial-type hearing before discharging an employee. O'Connor
correctly pointed out that to do so would impede the employer's
reliance upon available non-evidentiary resources when making the
decision to discharge an employee.76 At the same time, O'Connor
rejected Justice Scalia's argument that the First Amendment
provides public employees protection only from retaliatory
discharge.77 Instead, Justice O'Connor asserted that the trial court
should accept the government employer's fact-finding only if it was
reasonable.78
In addition, the First Amendment implies some procedural
due process requirements. 7 9 For example, the Supreme Court held
in Chicago Teacher Union v. Hudson that "a nonunion employee,
whose First Amendment rights are affected by an agency shop
arrangement and who bears the burden of objecting to agency shop
fee, is entitled to have his objections addressed in an expeditious,

76 id.

77Id.
78

Id.

79 See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
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fair, and objective manner."808However, like Waters, the Supreme
Court in Hudson did not require a "full-dress administrative
hearing, with evidentiary safeguards.""
Indeed, Justice O'Connor's requirement of a reasonable
investigation may be an additional form of procedural due process.
Whenever a public employer receives a complaint of employee
misconduct, the nature of the complaint notifies the employer as to
whether the misconduct involves speech. The public employer
should investigate the employee's speech to avert the risk of
unknowingly discharging the employee for engaging in First
Amendment protected speech. Such a risk could easily be avoided
by affording the employee a pretermination hearing where she is
given notice of the charges against her, an explanation of the
evidence against her, and an opportunity for the employee to
respond or rebut the charges against her. Employees who have a
property interest in their continued employment are already entitled
to a pretermination hearing, so there is no reason to believe that
extending such a hearing to employees whose speech is under
inquiry will be any more disruptive to the employer's interest in
maintaining an efficient workplace.
Thus, if Churchill had been given a pretermination hearing
she would have received proper notice of the reason for her
discharge. Moreover, Churchill would have known that the
conversation in dispute was that which occurred on December 16,
1987. Having been informed that the conversation was the reason
for her discharge, Churchill would have had the opportunity to
explain or rebut the facts as given to her employer. She would then
I Chicago Teachers Union, Local No. 1 v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292, 307 (1986)
(rejecting the union's suggestion that the availability of ordinary judicial

remedies is sufficient).
"' Id. at 308.
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have been able to relate to her employer her version of what took
place. While the dispute would involve one person's words against
another, both sides of the story would have been heard and the
employer would have known what to investigate. During that
investigation, Churchill's employer would have learned that two
additional witnesses, Dr. Koch and Nurse Welty, heard the
conversation. As a result, the hospital would probably have been
required to consult the two witnesses for their versions of the events
prior to discharging Churchill. This is the minimal amount of
procedure that the hospital should be required to conduct prior to
discharging Churchill. Otherwise, the hospital is not likely to find
that Churchill's speech is protected by the First Amendment.
2. When Employee Discharged for Conduct Other than
Speech
To require an employer to conduct a Loudermill
pretermination hearing for speech is not the same as requiring the
employer to make available such a hearing for conduct other than
speech. A public employer need not give a pretermination hearing
to an employee who has engaged in misconduct that does not
involve speech when that employee has no property interest in her
continuing employment.' If there is nothing to put the public
employer on notice -that the conduct in question was speech
protected by the First Amendment, then the employer ffeed only
conduct a reasonable investigation as suggested in Waters.
For example, in situations such as the hypothetical discussed
earlier, 3 nothing in the complaint alerted the employer to suspect
2 LoudermilI,
83

470 U.S. at 541-543.

See supra Section I.D.
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the complaint was anything other than what it appeared to be on its
face. Specifically, the nature of the complaint was that the officer
was reading while on duty. The supervisor, in conducting his
investigation, relied on the words of two officers. Moreover, the
supervisor witnessed the prohibited conduct himself after receiving
the complaint. Certainly, the prohibited conduct was brought to the
attention of a supervisor only because the officer had political views
which differed from those of the rest of the department. Indeed,
had the supervisor conducted a more thorough investigation, he
might have learned that the officer was "set up" because of his
constitutionally protected political association. However, because
the supervisor had no knowledge that the conduct in question arose
from the officer's political association, the supervisor was under no
obligation to conduct the investigation further.
To be sure, even if it should subsequently turn out that the
real reason the complaint was brought to the supervisor's attention
was the officer's political association, an employer should not be
required to conduct a more thorough investigation into the nature of
the complaint. To require otherwise would be unduly intrusive of
the employer's managerial interest in maintaining an efficient and
effective workplace. Thus, using the standard set out in Waters, it
is clear the supervisor conducted a reasonable investigation.
VI. CONCLUSION

To conduct a reasonable investigation, Waters v. Churchill
suggests that the employer must give the employee a pretermination
hearing whenever the complaint of employee misconduct involves
speech. Certainly, when a public employee has a property interest
in his continued employment, the employer is required to give that
employee a pretermination hearing. Extending a pretermination
hearing to employees whose speech is under inquiry is no more
burdensome on the employer in maintaining an efficient and
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effective workplace. The hearing notifies the employee of the
reason for her discharge, and gives her an opportunity to respond
or rebut the charges. On the other hand, Waters does not suggest
that a pretermination hearing is required when the employee is
accused of misconduct that does not involve speech. To require
otherwise would unduly burden and intrude upon the public
employer's managerial interest in maintaining an efficient and
effective workplace.

